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from their current account balances. This phenomenon can be explained by value 
changes of cross border assets and liabilities that are not registered on the balance 
of payments. These value changes have impact on the net external investment 
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to diverge. Such divergent developments can be attributed to currency developments, 
differences of composition of external assets and liabilities and performance effects. 
These mechanisms are discussed, followed by two case studies, viz. the case of the 
‘black hole’ (the Netherlands) and the case of ‘dark matter’(the US). Understanding 
the relation between the international investment position of a country and 
its balance of payments becomes more and more relevant as countries 
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1. Introduction: the challenges of ageing
Many European countries are slowly awakening to the challenge of ageing of the 
population. Ageing will affect the European economies in many ways. It will lead 
to higher public expenditures on healthcare and pensions [Canton et al. (2004)]. 
Moreover, as a result of ageing the ratio between the workforce and the retired will 
deteriorate, which will result in a higher burden for the working population and a 
relative decline of the economic basis of the countries involved.3
Many countries have pension systems that are organized on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
basis, which means that the pensions of the retired are paid by the working. In Europe, 
only the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have an extended capital based pension 
system, which has translated into the creation of huge pension funds.4 
However, the creation of a capital based pension system only solves part of the 
problem. In a closed system, the difference between a PAYG system and a capital 
based pension system is much smaller than usually supposed. This is because ageing 
of the population not only brings higher expenditures, but also erodes the supply 
side of the economy. Higher spending of the retired in combination with an absolute 
decline of the labour will lead to increasing national savings defi cits (defi cits on the 
current account of the balance of payments).
If countries want to prevent to build up net external debt positions due to ageing, they 
can try to build up a strong net international asset position before the ageing process 
begins to bite. In the Netherlands, this is more or less offi cial policy. However, as 
it turns out the creation of saving surpluses is not a guarantee for such an asset 
position, as for many countries other forces co-determinate the development of their 
international investment position. 
In this article, I will start with a short summary of the theoretical considerations 
behind the ratio of the creation of a national savings surplus. Next, chapter 2 will 
discuss the determinants of the external position of countries and confront the 
question whether or not a savings surplus will attribute to the creation of a net 
international asset position. After this theoretical exercise, I will discuss two case 
studies, viz. the Netherlands (chapter 3, the case of the “black hole”) and the United 
States of America (chapter 4, the case of “dark matter”). The US case is treated less 
3  A comprehensive discussion of the process of ageing and the possible policy reactions can be found 
in Balling et al. (2007), in which a selection of articles (including a number of country studies) on the 
subject is published.
4  Note, however, that the capital based part of the old-age provision in the Netherlands only concerns 
the supplementary pensions. The basic general old age provision, the so-called AOW, is still organ-
ized on a PAYG basis.
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extensively than the Dutch case, as there already is a broad literature on the external 
position of the American economy. Chapter 5 concludes.
2. The buffer function of a net external asset position
In a closed economy, a capital based system of old-age provisions is only marginally 
better than a PAYG system, because in such a situation all gross savings have to be 
reinvested in the domestic economy. This can be seen if one does not look only at 
the fi nancial consequences of ageing, but also at the real effects. The basic difference 
between both systems lies in the fact that in a PAYG-system the pensioners are 
dependent on the working part of the population. The premiums paid by the last 
group form the income of the retired. In a scenario of an ageing population, a 
decreasing group of workers will have to pay for a growing number of pensioners. 
For the working part of the population, this will lead to a growing fi nancial burden 
and sooner or later they may no longer be prepared to pay the bill. 
From a fi nancial point of view, the creation of a capital based system solves most 
of the problems of a PAYG-system. Working people save for their own old-age 
provision, leading to savings surpluses and a build-up of pension wealth in the 
years in which the working group is at its largest. Once the non-working part of the 
population takes the upper hand, pension funds will start to distribute their wealth to 
the pensioners, who pay for their own non-productive years. From this point of view 
it is clearly a superior system.
In a closed economy high pension savings may lead, via high gross private savings, 
to lower interest rates and higher investment, and thus to a higher production capacity 
in the future (plus more capital per worker in the future, leading to higher wages and 
leaving everybody better off) [Canton et al. (2004)],5 However, ageing itself results 
in declining savings which also translates into declining investment [Kaufmann 
(1993), Duisenberg & Wellink (1993)]. Therefore, once the population starts to age, 
ultimately the expenditures of the retired would be matched by a relatively shrinking 
economic base. Ageing leads to a relative decline of the productive potential of a 
country, which will be even more pronounced in a scenario in which the active part 
of the population starts to shrink not only in relative, but also in absolute terms. The 
combination of increasing expenditure by pensioners and a shrinking real economic 
base will result in higher infl ation. The distribution question between workers and 
5  However, in a system of obligatory participation in a collective pension system, it may be expected 
that voluntary private savings decline, as the system ‘automatically’ takes care of the old age provi-
sion. The resulting decline in voluntary savings reduces the upward effect on the gross private saving 
ratio. As a result, an increase in compulsory savings is partially neutralized by a decline in non-com-
pulsory savings [Duisenberg & Wellink (1993)].
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pensioners returns in a different shape than in a PAYG-system, although basically it 
is the same problem [Boonstra (2007-a)].
Traditionally, there has been a strong relation between domestic savings and 
investment ratios [Feldstein & Horioka (1980)]. However, in a world that is 
increasingly characterized by huge free cross border fi nancial fl ows, one may expect 
that this link may become looser over time. This makes it possible for countries to 
create net savings surpluses and invest them abroad. 
Therefore, for a capital based system to be effective, cross border investments need 
to play a role in this system [Börsch-Schupan et al. (2006), Canton et al. (2004)]. 
Countries can aim at the creation of national savings surpluses (surpluses on the 
current account of the balance of payments) in order to create a net international 
asset position. Once a country successfully builds up net international assets with the 
aim of saving for the ageing of the population the situation can improve considerably. 
First, net foreign assets may be expected to result in a positive fl ow of capital income, 
adding to domestic income. When the increase in the number of retirees results in 
an increase in spending relative to production, the merchandise trade balance may 
be expected to gradually deteriorate, turning from positive into negative during this 
process. A net positive income fl ow on foreign assets can for a period prevent the 
current account from turning into the red as well. Once the current account goes into 
defi cit, this can be fi nanced by eating into the net foreign assets. 
This reasoning traditionally forms the basic justifi cation for the large Dutch national 
savings surplus. In a recent report by the CPB, the Dutch National Institute for Policy 
Analysis, it advises to create even larger surpluses on the current account in the 
future [Van Ewijk et al. (2006)]. It argues that a structural national savings surplus 
will create a fi nancial buffer for future defi cits on the trade balance.
The implicit assumption is, of course, that other countries such as developing or 
emerging economies are prepared to run savings defi cits and build up foreign debt. 
The productive employment of the savings surpluses of industrial countries in emerging 
economies helps to expand their economic potential. Once they start to repay their debt 
they will have savings surpluses themselves, which creates the space for the ageing 
industrial countries to run current defi cits. One important observation here, however, 
is that many industrial countries actually run defi cits on their current account, while 
many emerging economies have huge surpluses. In many ways it looks like a situation 
in which ‘the poor are fi nancing the rich’. This issue is already extensively discussed 
in the literature. It can be explained by a number of factors, such as capital markets 
imperfections, greater risks on investment in emerging economies (neutralizing the 
higher potential marginal returns) and lack of absorption capacity in emerging countries, 
that force their own savings to go abroad to countries with better developed fi nancial 
systems [Bernanke (2005), Caballero (2006), Gourinchas & Jeanne (2007), Lucas 
(1990), Prasad et al. (2007)]. Moreover, an exchange rate policy that aims at preventing 
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its currency to appreciate sharply against the US dollar forces an emerging country like 
China, that in addition to its savings surplus receives huge infl ows of foreign investment 
fl ows, to invest heavily in US assets itself [Dooley et al. (2003) (2004)].
A second, more explicit assumption is that a surplus on the current account 
automatically results in a net external asset position. It is this last assumption we will 
deal with in this article.
3. The international investment position and the balance 
of payments
The international investment position of a country is a balance sheet that refl ects the 
stocks of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities at a point in time. The balance of 
payments of a country refl ects the fl ow of (trade and fi nancial) transactions between 
this country and the rest of the world during a certain period. 
Naturally, there is a link between the balance of payments and changes in the stocks 
of foreign assets and liabilities. Many textbooks explain changes in the international 
investment position of a country from its balance on the current account [Pugel & 
Lindert (2000), chapter 15 and Sawyer & Sprinkle (2006), chapter 11]. A country 
with a savings surplus builds up international assets (or runs down debts), while 
defi cit countries run down reserve assets or build up foreign debt.6 
6  The balance of payments statistics are fully compliant with the systems of national accounts. That a 
current account surplus refl ects a national savings surplus follows from the following set of identi-
ties: Y=C+I+G+(X-M) and Y+C+S+T, in which Y stand for gross national income, C (G) = private 
(public) consumption expenditures, I = gross investment, S = gross savings, T = taxes, X = exports 
(goods, services, transfers and income from abroad) and M = imports. Combined these two identities 
result into (X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G), in which (X-M) equals the balance on the current account, (S-I) is 
the net savings balance of the private sector and (T-G) equals the net savings of the public sector. As 
a result, (X-M) equals total net national savings. For the sake of simplicity we do not take the capital 
account into consideration. This is a relatively minor balance which includes a.o. capital transfers, 
migrants transfers and debt forgiveness. In the context of this exercise we can treat these transactions 
as if they are part of the current account. The direct link between the current account balance and the 
international investment position of countries emerges from the fi nancial account and the changes in 
reserves. When a country has a surplus its the current account balance, it receives foreign currency, 
that either is added to the offi cial reserves (part of the international assets) or is added to the net for-
eign assets of its banking systems. In the real world, its residents will acquire foreign assets (such as 
direct investments or portfolio investments), which are recorded as a gross outfl ow on its fi nancial 
account. At the same time foreign investors will acquire assets in a country (adding to its liabilities), 
which will be recorded as a gross infl ow on the fi nancial account. The net acquisition of foreign as-
sets (measured as a net outfl ow on the fi nancial account) plus the changes in net reserves is the direct 
link between the balance of payments and the international investment position. 
 As the overall balance of the balance of payments by defi nition equals zero, we can work from the 
identity that CA + NFA +RES + EO = 0 (which equals CA = -FA – RES –EO), refl ecting the balance 
on respectively the current (CA) and fi nancial (FA) accounts and the changes in reserves (RES). EO 
are the errors and omissions, refl ecting statistical inaccuracies. Note that a negative sign at FA and 
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In formula: 
 NIIPt = Σ CA (1)
in which NIIP stands for the Net International Investment Position of a country and 
CA is its current account of the balance of payments. Formula (1) is identical with:
 NIIPt = NIIPt-1 + CAt    (2)
 NIIPt – NIIPt-1 = CAt (3)
For many developing countries and emerging economies this equation still holds. 
Most countries that have run into debt problems in the past, such as Mexico and 
other Latin American countries but also the UK in the 1970s, fi rst experienced a long 
period of current defi cits [Williamson (ed., 1983), part III (country studies)].
For countries that are fully integrated in the world economy and having well-
developed fi nancial sectors, such as most industrial countries, however, the current 
account balance is no longer the only or even the most important explaining factor 
for the development of the international investment position [Lane & Milesi-Ferretti 
(2005-a) (2005-b) (2006), Boonstra (2007-a)]. 
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate this effect for a number of industrialized countries. In 
this fi gure the change in the net international investment position (as reported by the 
IMF and measured in billions of US dollars) between 1980 and the end of 2006 is 
compared with the cumulative current account balance over this period. The variable 
‘difference’ refl ects the part of the change in the net international investment position 
of these countries that can not be explained by the current account. It appears that 
especially for small open economies the cumulative current account balance is 
dwarfed by these other changes in the international investment position.
The most important reason behind this phenomenon is the emergence of large cross 
border holding of assets between countries. In the process of globalisation, companies 
have invested in other countries, both by establishing new plants and by buying 
foreign companies. Investors have diversifi ed their portfolios over currencies and 
countries. Today, these investment fl ows are larger than trade fl ows and are certainly 
much larger than current account balances [Kindleberger (1985) (1993); Schularick 
(2005)]. For example, even today the US, already by far the largest debtor in the 
world, is borrowing heavily abroad, not only in order to fi nance its current account 
defi cit but also to fi nance a net outfl ow of direct and equity portfolio investment 
[Gourinchas & Rey (2005-a) (2005-b), Boonstra (2008)]. 
RES refl ect a net increase in foreign assets. See IMF (1993), chapter III.
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Figure 1a: Cumulative current account balances and changes in net external 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
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This process has led to a situation in which most industrial countries are connected 
with huge gross cross-border investment positions. Figures 2a and 2b illustrate 
how the international assets and liabilities of a number of industrialized countries 
have grown substantially in comparison to their GDP. Today, the net international 
investment position of many countries is only the tip of the iceberg of much larger 
cross border gross asset and liability positions. 
As a result, the return on these gross positions becomes increasingly important. It is 
essential, however, to realise that a large part of these returns is not registered on the 
balance of payments. Flows of dividends, interest payments and repatriated profi ts 
are usually registered on the income account (a component of the current account) 
of the balance of payments, and efforts are being made to register reinvested profi ts 
as well on the income account. But there are important sources of income from cross 
border holdings that are not registered on the balance of payments. Examples are 
adjustments of the book value of foreign direct investment, gains and losses on cross-
border holding of securities and currency gains and losses. These returns increasingly 
explain the movement of the international investment position, overshadowing the 
importance of the balance of payments. To gain insight in the development of the 
international investment position of a country, it is necessary to analyze (in addition 
to balance of payments fl ows), the value changes of both gross external assets and 
liabilities [Lane & Milesi-Feretti (2002), IMF (1993), chapter XXIII and Appendix 
I].
This leads to the next formula, in which value changes are included:
 NIIPt = NIIP(t-1) + CAt + (kAt*A(t-1)) – (kLt*L(t-1)) (4)
in which A are the gross external assets, L are gross external liabilities and kA (kL) is 
the value change of external assets (liabilities).
The determinants identifi ed
What are then, in addition to the balance of payments fl ows, the determinants of those 
value changes? The answer lies in a number of factors, viz. the composition of gross 
cross border assets and liabilities, in the performance of the various categories of 
assets and liabilities and the behaviour of the exchange rate. Moreover, the larger the 
absolute size of gross cross border holdings, the stronger these effects will work.
Let’s start with the exchange rate. Depreciation of a country’s currency results in 
gains on its holdings in foreign currency denominated assets and vice versa. On the 
other hand, such a depreciation may also translate in an increase in value of it foreign 
liabilities.
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The net size of this so-called exchange rate effect and its direction is dependent on 
the currency composition of cross border assets and liabilities and on the starting 
position: for a debt-ridden country the situation will be different than for a country 
with large net foreign assets. 
The currency composition of external assets and liabilities plays an important role. 
For a traditional debtor country, like for example Brazil in the 1980s, a depreciation 
of the local currency translated in a strong increase of its debt burden, which largely 
was denominated in hard currencies, compared to its gross domestic product (GDP). 
However, for the US, another country with a large net debt position, the situation is 
completely different. A weak dollar not only helps the American competitive position 
on world markets, but it also increases the dollar value of its gross foreign assets. 
The US foreign liabilities are for an overwhelming part denominated in dollars 
[Gourinchas & Rey (2005-a)]. To illustrate the power of this effect: the recent net 
dollar depreciation has resulted in net currency gains of almost $ 900 billion between 
end 2001 and end 2006 (as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on 
its website (April 2008); see also table 3 in chapter 4).
The importance of the composition of assets and liabilities comes to the fore if we 
realise that the yield between categories can differ strongly and manifest themselves 
in different forms. This is illustrated in table 1. This table shows the composition of 
external assets and liabilities for the countries we will discuss in this article. By way 
of illustration three other major industrial countries have been added.
Table 1: Composition of external assets and liabilities of industrial countries  in 2005
United States Netherlands Finland Japan Germany United 
Kingdom





















































32 21 26 18 23 14 9 4 17 15 15 10
Portfolio equity 28 17 20 20 18 31 10 41 16 11 13 12
Low return / low risk
Porftfolio debt 
instruments
9 34 25 28 25 28 40 15 22 39 15 16
Other 30 28 28 33 31 27 22 40 43 34 56 62
Offi cial reserves 2 n.a. 1 n.a. 3 n.a. 20 n.a. 2 n.a. 1 n.a.
Source: Based on IMF-data (International Financial Statistics (IFS)), Boonstra (2008), table 4.4
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We can differentiate between high yield/ high risk categories (direct investment, 
portfolio equities) on the one hand and low yield / low risk categories (debt securities, 
loans, interbank positions) on the other. In the high yield categories the yield usually 
comes in the shape of capital gains (or losses), while dividends and profi ts carry 
relatively minor weight. In the low yield categories capital gains play a relatively 
minor role (although capital gains on bonds with a longer duration still can be 
substantial), as the largest part of their yield comes as interest income. If the external 
assets of a country have a strong emphasis on the high yield categories, while its 
liabilities consist largely of debt, it may be expected that it usually has a relatively 
high return on its assets, although large parts of this return will not be registered 
on the balance of payments. This is the case for the US. For Finland and Japan, 
countries with a very large share of its foreign liabilities consisting of equities, it is 
exactly the other way around.
The change in the net international investment position resulting from differences 
in capital gains on foreign assets and liabilities is usually called the composition 
effect.
The next effect to be discussed is the so-called performance effect. This appears 
when, within one category, there appear to be differences between yields on assets 
and liabilities. This effect can result, for example, from differences between the 
performance of the local stock exchange relative to foreign markets. It may also 
result if fund managers outperform their foreign competitors. This last effect appears 
to be apparent in the Netherlands [Kusters (1998)].
The performance effect is clearly manifest in many countries, such as Japan, the 
Netherlands and most of all in Finland. Last mentioned country even became a victim 
of its own success. A strong performance of the local stock exchange translated into 
an increasing foreign liability position. In spite of a rather strong balance of payments 
performance, the net international investment position of Finland deteriorated 
substantially due to the success of Nokia, because of the profi ts gained by foreigners 
on their holdings of Nokia shares (fi gure 3). Later, when the telecom industry suffered 
a strong decline in its stock price, the Finnish external position improved strongly, 
due to a decline of the value of its foreign liabilities. 
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Source: Data on the IIP and balance of payments originate from the IMF, International Financial 
 Statistics; stock exchange data are derived from MSCI via Ecowin
The Finnish example also illustrates the diffi cult relationship between national wealth 
and the international investment position. Nokia has contributed substantially to the 
good performance of the Finnish economy since the middle of the 1990s. Moreover, 
the rise in value of Nokia shares will also have increased the wealth of this company’s 
Finnish shareholders. Their increased wealth will almost certainly have contributed 
to economic growth via positive wealth effects, leading to increased production and 
a higher Finnish GDP. Although the country has become richer thanks to Nokia, its 
net external position in equity investment deteriorated strongly from minus $ 21.9 
billion at year-end 1996 to minus $ 206 billion at the end of 1999. 
To summarise, the change in the net international investment position of a country 
is not only determined by the balance on its current account, but is also strongly 
infl uenced by the yield (capital gains or losses) on its holdings abroad minus the 
yield made by foreign investors in its domestic market. Determining factors are the 
composition of the assets and liabilities, the relative success in investing abroad 
compared to the success of foreign investors in the home market and the currency 
competition of foreign assets and liabilities. The larger a country’s gross foreign 
assets and liabilities are, the larger the relative importance of the capital gains and 
losses on these cross-border holdings become.7 
7 Of course, the returns on the various categories each have their own explanations. A more formal illus-
tration of the effects and their underlying explanations can be found in Boonstra (2008), appendix 2.
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4. The Netherlands: the case of the black hole
In this section of this article we will more closely analyse the driving factors behind 
the Dutch international investment position. The Dutch case is extensively discussed 
in Bruinshoofd and Kool (2008-a) (2008-b) and Boonstra (2007-a) (2008) and earlier 
by Kusters (1998). Here we confi ne ourselves to a discussion of the most important 
elements. 
A high savings economy
The Netherlands have a very open economy, which is illustrated by high export and 
import ratios. The country has a system of old age provisions that is largely based 
on a capital-based pension industry. This system was established shortly after the 
Second World War. As participation in the system is compulsory for all employees 
in both the private and the public sector, this system has resulted in huge collective 
savings. It is beyond the scope of this article to describe the Dutch pension system 
in more detail. This is extensively discussed in the literature [Kuné (2006), Canton 
et al. (2004)].
The high level of institutionalised savings has resulted in a structural national savings 
surplus [Bikker (1994)]. Both in absolute and in relative terms it traditionally is 
amongst the largest in the world. In the years we will investigate more closely, 1987 
– 2006, the cumulative surplus on the current account amounted to € 321 billion.8 In a 
recent study on the impact of ageing on the Dutch public fi nances the Dutch National 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis concludes that the government budget should 
show a surplus of 3% of GDP in 2011. This will also lead to even higher surpluses 
on the current account, which is considered a positive development [Van Ewijk et al. 
(2006]. However, in spite of all the saving efforts, the country has failed to build up 
a substantial external net asset position. 
Financial fl ows and net IIP 
The openness of the Dutch economy can also be read from the fi nancial account of 
the balance of payments. This is characterized by huge in- and outfl ows of capital, 
in the form of direct investments, portfolio investments and other fl ows. As a result, 
the country’s gross external assets and liabilities both have accrued to an amount of 
8 All data in this chapter are based on the database of the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and can be found 
on its website (www.dnb.nl). These data are also published in its quarterly Statistical Bulletin, in 
tables 5.1 (balance of payments), .5.4 (income account) 5.7.1 (portfolio securities fl ows) and 5.11 
(international investment position). 
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more than € 2,200 billion (position at year end 2006, close to $ 3,000 billion, over 
400% of GDP).9 
Over the decades, capital outfl ows were substantially larger than infl ows, which 
refl ects the country’s net savings surplus. Initially, this indeed translated into the 
building up of a positive net foreign asset position, although its size appeared to 
be disappointedly low [Kusters (1998)]. At its peak, in 1988, net foreign assets 
amounted to € 59 billion (27.3% GDP). However, from that year onwards the fi gure 
started gradually to decline, despite large current account surpluses. In 1998 the 
country became a net debtor. In 2002 the international investment position reached 
an all-time low of minus € 113 billion (minus 24.4% GDP), after which a strong 
recovery took place. At year-end 2006, the net foreign asset position was a meagre € 
4 billion (less than 1% GDP). 
The development of the Dutch net international investment position (net IIP) is 
illustrated in fi gure 4. In this fi gure, both the cumulative change in net IIP and the 
cumulative current account balance since end 1986 are shown. The area between the 
lines is the cumulative gap, the change in net IIP that cannot be explained by balance 
of payment fl ows.
Figure 4: Changes in the net international investment position of the Netherlands 








87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Cumulative Change Net IIP Cumulative Current Account Balance
Source: Calculated from DNB, data February 2008
9 This is without the so-called Specialized Financial Institutions (‘bijzondere fi nanciële instellingen, 
BFIs). If we would include such BFIs, which consist of companies that have ther headquaters in the 
Netherlands for tax reasons, Dutch external assets and liabilities both amount to more than € 3,600 
billion.($ 4,900 billion).
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The question to be answered is why the Dutch failed to build up a strong net 
international asset position. The offi cial reaction is that the data on the international 
investment position are unreliable and that, if better data were available, it would 
appear that the Netherlands would be a strong international credit nation after all 
[Van Ewijk et al. (2006)]. However, this ‘explanation’ is rather weak, even more so 
since both the balance of payments data and the data on the international investment 
position originate from the same survey [DNB (2003)]. 
The difference between the cumulative current account surpluses and the change in 
the net international investment position of the Netherlands between 1987 and 2006, 
fi rst nicknamed the Dutch ‘black hole’ by Kusters (1998), can to a large extent be 
explained by the composition, performance and currency effects mentioned earlier.
The Dutch net losses are the result of a combination of factors. First, annual 
exchange rate losses averaged to slightly more than 0.4%, due to the strength of 
the Dutch guilder and later the euro.10 The composition effect played an important 
role in the category portfolio equities, as foreign investors had build up portfolios in 
Dutch equities before Dutch investors started to invest in foreign equities on a large 
scale. Over the whole period, the net cross-border position in equity investments 
has been negative. This composition effect was reinforced by the fact that foreign 
equity investors on average had a higher return on Dutch equities than the other way 
around (performance effect). See table A1 in the appendix for more details. This is 
due both to the fact that the Dutch stock exchange in many years outperformed other 
stock markets.11
In the category foreign direct investment the Dutch suffered large losses, most of them 
in the United States, but also in Europe. Again, foreign investors in the Netherlands 
were more successful (see appendix, table A2). In the category debt instruments, the 
Netherlands benefi ted from a positive performance effect, but the composition effect 
worked against this (appendix, table A3). Finally, the category other investments 
also showed net losses which, given the composition of this category, is not very 
logical. However, it is in this category were all statistical diffi culties accumulate (see 
also footnote with table 2) [Boonstra (2008), chapter 6].
Table 2 shows how the ‘black hole’ can for a large extent be explained by capital 
changes of assets and liabilities. Note, that this calculation of the actual size of the 
gap in fact is a best case scenario, as all errors and omissions are deducted from the 
current account surplus. In practice, part of the errors and omissions will have to be 
attributed to the fi nancial account, which will translate in a larger ‘black hole’, in the 
process increasing the ‘other’ effects. 
10 This fi gure is derived from the annual change (calculated from December values) in the nominal ef-
fective exchange rate, as reported by the IMF in its IFS. 
11 See the footnote at the bottom of table A1 for an explanation of the calculation methods used.
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In this table, the capital gains and losses have been defi ned as the difference between 
the change in the net asset position per category and the balance of payments fl ows. 
This approach works from the assumption that the data on the international investment 
position and the balance of payments data are of the same quality. At least for the 
Dutch case, this assumption seems justifi ed [DNB (2003, chapter 10)]. 
Table 2: The Dutch ‘black hole’ summarised (1986 – 2006)













Cumulative building up of net foreign assets 238.6 -
Change in net International Investment Position 
(year end positions, 1986 - 2006)
-46.0 -
Net capital gains or losses (the black hole) -284.6 -
Of which:
Capital gains (+) or losses (-) on Dutch foreign direct investments
Capital gains (+) or losses on foreign direct investments in the Netherlands







Capital gains (+) or losses (-) on Dutch investments in foreign equities
Capital gains (+) or losses on foreign investments in Dutch equities







Capital gains (+) or losses (-) on Dutch foreign debt securities
Capital gains (+) or losses on foreign investments in Dutch debt securities







Other (categories reserves, fi nancial derivatives and other) -63.5 -
Note: The capital gains and losses are calculated by deducting, for every individual category, the 
balance of payments fl ows from the registered change in the net international investment in that 
particular category. The details per category are shown in tables A1 to A3 in the appendix. The 
exchange rate effect as mentioned in the text is calculated by using the nominal effective exchange 
rate (source IMF). This is a rough approximation, as the currency composition of most asset and 
liability categories is not known. Until December 2007, the Dutch central bank did not publish 
a so-called reconciliation table, which explains the gap between balance of payments fl ows and 
changes in the international investment position.
Source: Boonstra (2008), chapter 6, updated, based on DNB data as available in March 2008.
However, it should be reminded that the analysis per subcategory nevertheless has 
its limitations. Earlier, when discussing the example of Finland, it was mentioned 
that the deterioration of the external position of this country was a side-effect of the 
Wim Boonstra • National savings and the international investment position... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2008 • vol. 26 • sv. 1 • 9-40  25
extremely strong performance of its stock exchange. It can also be illustrated by 
an example from the Dutch experience. Ahold, a major Dutch retailing company, 
has suffered serious losses on its direct investments in the US. This is part of the 
explanation of the poor Dutch performance in the category direct investment in the 
year 2002. However, these losses have contributed to a fall in the share price of Ahold 
on the Amsterdam stock exchange. Given the fact that a large part of the shares of 
Ahold was in foreign hands, a substantial part of the capital loss on Ahold shares 
was shared by foreign investors (which was from the Dutch perspective a positive 
factor for the relative return on cross-border equity holdings). This illustrates the 
complexity of the issue at hand. 
This case illustrates that for a small open economy with free fi nancial fl ows, due to 
the very large cross border positions in direct and portfolio investments, the return 
on cross border assets and liabilities have much more impact on the net international 
investment position than the balance on the current account. A savings surplus 
appears to be no guarantee at all for the creation of a solid net international asset 
position. 
5. The United States: the case of dark matter
The US external position is well-documented in the international literature.12 
Moreover, as the US publishes detailed reconciliation data form 1989 onwards, data 
availability is relatively abundant. Therefore, this case be treated more briefl y than the 
Dutch case. For our analysis, the US case is of interest because it mirrors the Dutch 
and Finnish experiences. In the Dutch case the development of the international 
investment position is, seen in the light of large structural savings surpluses, very 
disappointing. In the US case it is exactly the opposite: in spite of large and increasing 
current defi cits the deterioration of the US international investment position is much 
slower than to be expected. 
The US have had defi cits on their current account for decades. Since 1980, a year in 
which the US current account was more or less in equilibrium, the cumulative current 
defi cits amounted to $ 6,000 billion. As a result of this, the US have developed into 
the world’s major debtor nation. At the end of 2006 the net international investment 
position was about $ 2,140 billion negative (with direct investment valued at market 
value)13. 
The evolvement of the world’s leading economy into a major debtor is a logical 
consequence of its uninterrupted chain of defi cits. However, a closer look at the data 
12 See for example contributions by Bernanke (2005) (2007), Dooley et al. (2003) (2004), Higgins et 
al. (1998) (2005) (2006), De Jong & Kamalodin (2008), Obstfeld (2004), Obstfeld & Rogoff (2004), 
Roubini & Setzer (2004) (2005) and Tille (2003).
13  All data in this chapter are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, april 2008).
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shows that there are two phenomena that require further explanation. Firstly, the 
pace of deterioration is much slower than one would expect, given the increasingly 
large current defi cits. Secondly, the US still have a positive balance on their income 
account (part of the current account), which is for a major debtor country indeed a 
strange phenomenon [Heath (2007)]. One would expect that payments on the external 
debt, such as interest rates and dividends, would push the capital income account of 
the balance of payments into the red. In spite of the reported major debt position, the 
income balance in 2006 showed a surplus of more than $ 40 billion. 
The dark matter case
In a rather provocative article in the Financial Times, Harvard Economists Ricardo 
Hausmann and Frederico Sturzenegger take the surplus on the income account as a 
starting point for a totally alternative approach [Hausmann & Sturzenegger (2005-a, 
2005-b)]. Their crucial, explicit assumption is that a country with a net surplus on 
its capital income account by defi nition owns net international assets. There they put 
forward the thesis that the US is not a debtor nation, but still a creditor nation. 
They estimate what they call the Dark Matter based net foreign asset position by 
using another assumption, that the average annual yield on the net foreign assets 
is 5%. From these assumptions, they calculate the US net international investment 
position by using formula 5:
 NIIPDMt = NICt * (1/rt) (5)
In which: 
 NIIPDMt = Dark Matter-based net international investment position
 NICt = Net capital income
 r = Assumed return (put at 5%)14
Using the methodology of Hausmann & Sturzenegger with data for 2006, we can 
calculate the US net foreign asset position to be $ 860 billion positive. There is a gap, 
in the terminology used by Hausmann & Sturzenegger named Dark Matter, of almost 
$ 6,900 billion between this estimate and the cumulative current defi cits reported by 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).15
14  Given this defi nition, we can also defi ne a ‘Dark Matter - based current account balance’ over a year 
as the change of Dark Matter-based IIP during the year: 





 In which CADMt is the Dark Matter current account balance. See Boonstra 2007-b for a further illus-
tration. 
15 Note that the amount of Dark Matter is not only very large, but appears to be growing very quickly 
as well. The estimation of Dark Matter in the original 2005 article by Hausmann & Sturzenegger 
amounted ‘only’ to $ 4,700 billion. 
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Although the Dark Matter approach at least is rather original, it also misses completely 
the point, because the surplus on the income account on the balance of payments can 
perfectly be explained without using “dark matter’. Moreover, as far as there is a gap 
between the cumulative defi cits of the current account and the offi cially reported 
change in the external asset position, this can also be very well explained by using the 
aforementioned composition, performance and currency effects. The link between the 
balance of payments fl ows and the changes in the international investment position of 
the US can be found in the reconciliation table as published by the BEA.
It goes beyond the scope of this article to elaborate further on the Dark Matter thesis; 
at this place I refer to the available literature [Buiter (2006), Boonstra (2007-b)]. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I will explain both phenomena, the positive income 
balance and the gap between the cumulative account defi cit and the change in 
external position, by a closer look at the composition of the US external assets and 
liabilities. 
There appears to be a signifi cant difference in composition, which was earlier 
illustrated by table 1. The US external assets consist overwhelmingly of direct 
investment, portfolio equity investments and so-called “other” assets (a.o. inter-bank 
positions and trade credit), while bonds have a very small share. The US external 
liabilities, on the other hand, are made up to a large extent of bonds, while portfolio 
equity investments and direct investment in the US are relatively small. On the one 
hand, the US still even have an international creditor position in the categories direct 
investment and portfolio equity investments, while on the other hand they have a 
major debit position in the category bonds.
This major difference in composition can help to explain both the surplus on the 
income account and part of the relatively slow deterioration of the US external 
investment position.
Let’s fi rst have a closer look at the income account. It appears that behind the net 
surplus on the capital income balance of $ 43 billion (2006) lie large gross fl ows. If 
this surplus is decomposed in the subcategories, it appears that the US have major 
net surplus in the category direct investment ($ 174 billion), but on the other hand 
a major defi cit ($ 131 billion) caused by interest payments on government bonds. 
The net surplus appears above all to be caused by the fact that the return on direct 
foreign investment appears to be much higher than the coupon yield on US treasury 
bonds. However, a large part of the US income from direct investments consists of 
non-repatriated profi ts [Gros (2006), Heath (2007)].16 
16 Gros (2006) points that the fact that foreign direct investment in the US are structurally underper-
forming US investment abroad. He explains that, due to tax reasons, foreign companies have good 
reasons to keep their reported profi ts in the US as low as possible. As a result, the offi cial data on the 
net income on direct investment are exaggerating the net income position of the US.
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Table 3: The US capital income account and the calculation of the IIP including 
Dark Matter
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Investment income, 
credit 224.0 254.6 259.4 291.2 348.1 287.9 278.4 317.8 399.1 502.6 647.6
Investment income, 
debit -197.5 -237.5 -250.6 -272.1 -322.3 -251.0 -245.2 -266.6 -336.6 -448.1 -604.4
Reinvested earnings 
and undistributed 
branch profi ts, credit
54.7 58.0 44.2 64.3 93.6 69.8 85.3 120.7 165.7 -20.4 220.1
Reinvested earnings 
and undistributed 
branch profi ts, debit
-8.5 -15.0 -2.8 -4.1 0.3 33.9 -1.6 -14.3 -49.4 -47.7 -70.6
Net reinvested etc. 46.2 43.1 41.4 60.1 93.9 103.6 83.7 106.4 116.3 -68.1 149.5
Net investment income 26.5 17.0 8.8 19.1 25.7 36.9 33.3 51.1 62.5 54.5 43.2
Net investment income 
(FDI income fl ows 
only)
-19.7 -26.0 -32.5 -41.0 -68.1 -66.7 -50.4 -55.3 -53.8 122.6 -106.3
Calculation of Dark Matter
Dark matter IIP (using 
formula 4) 529.0 340.8 176.8 382.0 514.8 738.6 665.2 1022.4 1250.0 1089.2 863.2
IIP as reported (FDI at 
market value) -360.0 -822.7 -1,070.8 -1,037.4 -1,581.0 -2,339.4 -2,454.3 -2,339.6 -2,396.7 -2,141.1 -2,140.5
Source: Data from website BEA, April 2008
Moreover, the exchange rate played an important role as well. In most years during 
the investigated period 2002 – 2006 (2005 being the exception), the years in which 
the current account defi cits reached unprecedented levels, the dollar was rather weak 
against other major currencies in the world. For the US this meant that foreign assets, 
most of them denominated in foreign currencies, became more profi table. Part of the 
increase in profi ts from direct investment abroad can be explained from this factor. 
It appears that the surplus on the US capital income account can be perfectly 
explained by a combination of the composition effect and the currency effect. The 
same is true for the gap between the cumulative current defi cits and the reported 
external investment position. Over the years the US appears to realize higher capital 
gains (which are not registered on the balance of payments) on their foreign assets 
than foreigners make on their US possessions. Part of this can be explained by the 
composition effect, but again the currency effect plays an important role [Tille 
(2003)]. This can best be illustrated by the developments in the years 2002 – 2006. 
Table 4 summarizes these fi ndings (more details for the longer period 1989 – 2006 
can be found in table A4 in the appendix). During the years 2002 – 2006 the US had 
a cumulative defi cit on its current account of $ 3,188 billion, net balance of payments 
infl ows amounted to $ 3,209 billion (the difference can be explained by errors and 
omissions). 
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In spite of this dazzling fi gure, its net international investment position actually 
improved by $ 199 billion. This can be explained by a net capital gain on its external 
assets of $ 3,387 billion, of which almost $ 900 billion can be explained by the 
net currency effect. This is caused by the fact that a large part, estimated at 70%, 
of US foreign assets are denominated in foreign currency, while liabilities are 
overwhelmingly denominated in dollars. 
Table 4: Change in US international investment position explained
Increase in US foreign assets due to:
1989 - 2006 2002 - 2006
Financial fl ows 6,834 3,007
Price effects 3,743 2,344
Currency effect 280 1,028
Other effects 2,412 1,968
Total 13,269 8,347
Increase in US foreign liabilities due to:
1989 - 2006 2002 - 2006
Financial fl ows 12,114 6,188
Price effects 2,254 649
Currency effect 80 136
Other effects 972 1,175
Total 15,420 8,148
Increase in US net international investment position due to:
1989 - 2006 2002 - 2006
Financial fl ows -5,308 -3,209
Price effects 1,488 1,694
Currency effect 200 892
Other effects 1,469 822
Total -2,151 199
Note: Negative sign at ‘fi nancial fl ows’ in bottom of table implies net increase in US liabilities. 
Direct investment are valued at market value. Price effects include changes in stock prices. Other 
includes changes in market value of direct investment and changes in coverage of data. Difference 
between net fi nancial fl ows and current balances can be explained by errors and omissions: Table 
may not add up fully due to cumulative rounding. 
Source: BEA website, April 2008
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6. Concluding remarks
The development of the external positions of countries can only partly be explained 
by the analysis of balance of payments data. Since developed countries have more 
or less completed the process of liberalization of their balance of payments, cross 
border capital fl ows have mushroomed. As a result, their economies are tied together 
by cross border investment to a much larger extent than only a couple of decades 
ago. Today, the change in the net international investment positions of countries are 
determined for the largest extent by the capital gains and losses on these cross border 
assets and liabilities. For open industrialized countries, the role of the balance on the 
current account in this respect is much less important than it was in the past. 
The gap between balance of payments fl ows and changes in the net international 
investment position of countries can be explained by value changes of assets and 
liabilities that are not captured by the balance of payments. To gain insight in 
the development of the external fi nancial position of countries it is necessary to 
analyze separately the value changes of external assets and liabilities. In addition to 
balance of payments fl ows, the resulting net changes can be explained by difference 
in composition between external assets and liabilities, differences in performance 
within categories (which happen for example as the performance of the local stock 
market differs substantially from the world average) and currency movements. A 
small but growing number of countries publish so-called reconciliation tables, in 
which these value changes are explained. 
The Dutch experience shows that, in today’s integrated world markets, a strong 
balance of payments is no guarantee at all for the creation of a substantial positive 
net international investment position. An unfavourable composition effect (in the 
categories equities, debt instruments) and strong negative performance effects (equities 
and direct investments) evaporated the cumulative savings surpluses. As a result, one 
may question the wisdom of the country’s policy that aims to generate huge savings 
surpluses by the creation of a high degree of institutionalized pension savings. 
The US experience mirrors that of the Dutch: in spite of huge defi cits on the current 
account, the deterioration of the US net international investment position takes 
place much slower than most people expected. Moreover, its capital income account 
remained in surplus until last year. In the case of the US, a positive composition effect 
is an important part of the explanation, given it strong emphasis on debt securities 
in its external liabilities and a still positive external position in the categories direct 
investment and equities. 
Neither the Dutch nor the American experience needs “black holes” or “dark matter” 
as explanation. A closer look at the capital (and currency) gains and losses on their 
cross border positions can explain most of the mystery; statistical discrepancies 
probably explain the remaining gap.
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Once policy makers acknowledge that the realization of a national savings surplus is 
no guarantee for a solid international asset position, they may have second thoughts 
concerning the wisdom behind the creation of large capital based pension funds as 
well. This, however, would be the wrong refl ex. Even if the creation of funded pension 
schemes does not translate automatically into a positive net international investment 
position, it remains a fact that a funded scheme in itself its superior than a PAYG 
scheme. The fi nancial claim of the retired is stronger and the fact that people save for 
their own old age provision instead of paying for the current elderly enhances public 
support for the system. 
If a country fails to build up of a net international investment position or, even worse, 
fi nd itself with a large net external liability position, the worst thing that can happen 
is that ageing will lead to a further increase of its external liabilities. This should 
not be a drama after all, although history has shown that the selling out of national 
industries to foreign investors sometimes create nationalistic sentiments. 
In today’s markets, a net liability position can be supported for long periods, although 
a country may become vulnerable for currency crises. Especially small countries 
with large gross foreign assets and even larges foreign liabilities are vulnerable for 
changes in sentiments on the currency markets. Iceland, that experienced such a 
crisis in 2006, is a good example of this. For European countries, however, the way 
ahead may be clear: once part of the eurozone, the individual member states are no 
longer prone for currency crisis.
Remains the question: should policy makers try to infl uence the net international 
investment position? Although intuitively many policy makers think that they 
should, one should appreciate that in a world of free fi nancial fl ows it will be very 
diffi cult, if not impossible, to infl uence the direction in which the net international 
investment position develops. In a market economy, in which investors make their 
investment decisions in freedom, the levers for government intervention are limited. 
Moreover, many potential measures aiming at infl uencing the external position may 
hamper economic development. Think of investment guidelines for companies and 
asset managers or measures that aim to prevent the takeover of domestic companies 
by foreign investors. As long as foreign investors are being driven by the usual profi t 
motives, it does not make difference whether companies are in foreign hands or 
not. Denying domestic companies full access to foreign capital markets may hamper 
their development, resulting in a net welfare loss. And denying foreign investors full 
access to the domestic economy may invite retaliation measures, hampering your 
own investors activities abroad.
In this respect, further research should aim at analyzing the international investment 
position of countries in the context of domestic national wealth, instead of relating it 
to income. In addition, more detailed case studies of the external position of individual 
countries are needed to fully understand the impact of the globalisation of economic 
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ownership. Because, even when a country still has net foreign assets, in a world of 
free fl owing capital and rational behaviour of investors it will be unavoidable that 
large parts of a country’s real and fi nancial assets nevertheless will in the long run to 
be in foreign hands.
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Nacionalna štednja i vanjsko neto investicijsko stanje: 
što doznajemo iz računa tekućih transakcija?
Wim Boonstra1
Sažetak
U ovom se članku raspravlja o odnosu između platne bilance i vanjskog neto 
investicijskog stanja zemalja. Polazno je stajalište da se vanjsko neto investicijsko 
stanje mnogih zemalja razvija neovisno o bilanci tekućeg računa. Taj fenomen 
može biti objašnjen promjenama vrijednosti vanjske imovine i obveza koje nisu 
registrirane u platnoj bilanci. Te promjene vrijednosti djeluju na vanjsko 
investicijsko stanje zemlje čim se njeni vanjski dobici i obveze počnu razlikovati. 
To se može objasniti promjenama u vrijednosti valute, razlikom u sastavu vanjske 
imovine i obveza, te učincima njihova djelovanja. Raspravu o tim mehanizmima 
slijede prikazi dva slučaja, tzv. nizozemske “crne rupe” i “tamne materije” u SAD. 
Razumijevanje odnosa između vanjskog neto investicijskog stanja i platne bilance 
postaje to važnije što se zemlja suočava sa starenjem populacije. Neke su zemlje 
izričito usmjerene k stvaranju viška štednje radi ostvarenja neto vanjske imovine. 
U zaključnom dijelu teksta raspravlja se o posljedicama neuspjeha takve politike.
Ključne riječi: platna bilanca, račun tekućih transakcija, vanjsko neto investicijsko 
stanje, starenje stanovništva 
JEL klasifi kacija: F15, F21, F32, F36
1 Dr.sc., Predavač na Vrije Sveučilištu (VU), Amsterdam, Ekonomski fakultet, De Boelelaan 1105, 
NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Nizozemska i glavni ekonomist na Rabobank, P.O. box 17100, NL-3500 
HG Utrecht, Nizozemska. Znanstveni interes: Novac i bankarstvo Tel.: +31302166617. E-mail: 
w.w.boonstra@rn.rabobank.nl. Osobna web stranica: www.rabobankgroep.nl/kennisbank
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